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SULLIVAN, HOUSEWRIGHT, FANIO NEW INTERPRETATION

OF THE 1965 ILLINOIS

TORT IMMUNITY ACT: THE EFFECT OF
LIABILITY

INSURANCE

INTRODUCTION

Since its origin in the early English common law, the doctrine of governmental tort immunity has been the subject of
frequent controversy.' In Illinois, its status has been affected
by conflicting case law, legislative reaction, and judicial construction.
The Illinois courts adopted the immunity doctrine with
reference to towns and counties in 1870, 2 and extended it to
school districts in Kinnare v. City of Chicago.' The rejection
of this doctrine in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District
No. 3024 set the stage for the modern development of the immunity doctrine in Illinois. In the years between Kinnare and
Molitor, several rationalizations in favor of the non-immunity
rule were advanced,' but equally strong arguments were made
1 The earliest fully reported case applying the doctrine is the English
case of Russell v. The Men dwelling in the County of Devon, 2 T.T. 667, 100
Eng. Rep. R. 359 (1788). In this case, the English court held that an action
would not lie against the county for an injury "to the wagfglon of the
plaintiffs in consequence of a bridge being out of repair, which ought to have
been repaired by the county." This 1788 decision was apparently based on
an antecedent case referred to therein as providing a precedent for the
decision. In the majority opinion it was said:
[T]here is no law or reason for supporting the action; and there is
a precedent-against it in Brooks, though even without that authority I
should be of opinion that this action cannot be maintained. (Emphasis
added.)
The court in Russell refers to "Bro. Abr. title 'Accion sur le Case,' pl.
93 where it is said that if an [sic] highway be out of repair by which my
horse is mired, no action lies; 'cur est populas et surra reforme per
presentment;' which must be understood to mean, that, as the road ought
to be repaired by the public, no individual can maintain an action against
them for any injury arising from their neglect."
A reference in Holdsworth's History of English Law (II HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAw,

545, (3d ed. 1909) states that the author of

Brooke's Abridgments died in 1558, so the case referred to as appearing
therein must have been decided before that year. Thus, the doctrine
originated at a very early time in the common law.
2 Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 (1870).
3 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898).
It should be noted that the English
courts had abrogated the rule eight years before this Ilinois case, definitely
establishing that a school board or school district is subject to suit in tort for
personal injuries on the same basis as a private individual or corporation.
Crisp v. Thomas, 63 L.T.N.S. 756 (1890).
4 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), (hereinafter cited as Molitor).
See Leviton v. Board of Education, 374 Ill. 594, 30 N.E.2d 497 (1940)
Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School Dist. No. 201, 348
Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
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against it.6 The legislature had also made some inroads on the
rule by making local public entities, including school districts,
subject to liability under several acts. 7 Cognizant of these
developments, 8 the Molitor court squarely rejected the theories
in support of immunity, declaring: "We are of the opinion that
none of the reasons advanced in support of school district immunity have any true validity today."
Thus, the Molitor court
held the school district liable in tort for the negligence of its
employee and expressly overruled "all prior decisions to the
contrary." 1o
The Molitor decision was applied to other areas of immunity, and, in reaction, the General Assembly soon enacted
a number of statutes granting immunity from tort liability to
local public entities. The case of Harvey v. Clyde Park District" was the first major judicial attack against these new
enactments, and provided a basis on which to attack much of
the immunity legislation then in force. Harvey applied section 22 of article IV of the 1870 Illinois Constitution, prohi'iting special legislation, to strike down section 12.1 of the
Park District Code,' 2 which granted immunity to park districts.
The General Assembly responded to Harvey by enacting the
present Illinois Tort Immunity Act.'8 The Act was written
to comply with the constitutional interpretation of Harvey,
granting immunities based solely on the function of the local
public entity rather than on any arbitrary classification of
persons or governmental units. Several provisions have already been tested in cases before the Illinois Supreme Court
and have been held valid; typical of these decisions is Maloney
v. Elmhurst Park District,14 where the court upheld a section
granting immunity on the functional basis of areas used as
15
park land.
Having considered the constitutionality of the Act, the
1 See Molitor, at 90.
7Id. at 91-2.
8 Notes 9, 10 supra.
9Molitor, at 95.
10 Id. at 98.
1132 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
12 Law of April 9, 1959, ch. 105,
12-1, (1959) ILL. LAWS (repealed
1967).
13Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§1-101 et seq. (1965) (hereinafter cited as Tort
Immunity Act).
14 47 Ill. 2d 367, 265 N.E.2d 654 (1970).
15 See Maloney v. Elmhurst Park District: Park District Tort Immunity
in Illinois, The Functional Dilemma, 5 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 368. Other
cases upholding the validity of sections of the Act are: Mills v. Winnebago

County, 104 111. App. 2d 366, 244 N.E.2d 65 (1969); Stubblefield v. City of
Chicago, 48 Ill. 2d 267, 269 N.E.2d 504 (1971) ; Shear v. City of Highland
Park, 104 Ill.
App. 2d 285, 244 N.E.2d 72 (1969) ; King v. Johnson, 47 Ill.
2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970).
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courts are now beginning to examine the construction and application of various sections of the statute. This article will
discuss three recent decisions involving the effect of section
9-103, which deals with the purchase of liability insurance by a
governmental unit, and the effect of such purchase on the immunities granted by the other sections of the Act. The three
cases to be discussed are: Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District,16 Housewright v. City of La Harpe,17 and Fanio v. John
W. Breslin Company.'8
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION

In the first of these cases, Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, the Supreme Court of Illinois not only affirmed the constitutionality of both the immunity and waiver of immunity
provisions but, more importantly, defined the relationship between the two. It held, in effect, that the purchase of liability
insurance reestablishes the decisional law under the Molitor
rationale.
In Sullivan, plaintiff, by her next friend, sought to recover
damages for injuries incurred while riding on a merry-go-round,
owned and maintained by the defendant, Midlothian Park District. Although count II contained allegations of willful and
wanton misconduct, count I merely alleged ordinary negligence
on the part of the park district, the existence of public liability
insurance, and the waiver of immunity by the district for damages caused by ordinary negligence to the extent of the insurance coverage. Count III was a direct action against the insurance carrier incorporating the allegations of count I, and
further contending that the insurance company had waived its
right to refuse payment or to deny liability by virtue of section
9-103(b) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employee Tort Immunity Act.' 9
The circuit court dismissed counts I and III of the complaint, stating that the park district and its employees were
not liable for ordinary negligence pursuant to section 3-106 of
51 Il. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972), (hereinafter cited as Sullivan).
1751 Ill. 2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972), (hereinafter cited as Housewright).
1851 Ill. 2d 366, 282 N.E.2d 443 (1972),
(hereinafter cited as Fanio).
1"

49 Section 9-103 (b) provides:

Every policy for insurance coverage issued to a local public entity

shall provide or be endorsed to provide that the Company issuing such

policy waives any right to refuse payment or to deny liability thereto
within the limits of said policy by reason of the non-liability of the insured public entity for the wrongful or negligent acts of itself or its
employees and its immunity from suit by reason of the defenses and
immunities provided in this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §9-103(b) (1971). The complaint, quoted in the
opinion, states that the defendant insurance company:
[Wlaived any right to refuse payment or to deny liability for the
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the Act, which grants immunity to park districts and their employees, 20 except for injury caused by willful and wanton con-

duct.

Further, the circuit court held that this immunity was

not waived to the extent of the liability insurance carried by

the district as provided in section 9-103 (b) and held this section
unconstitutional. Citing Grasse v. Dealers Transport Co. 21 and
Harvey v. Clyde Park District,22 the curcuit court stated:
"[N.Jo rational difference exists between liability for injuries of
all public entities that happen to be protected by liability insurance and the liability of public entities that happen to be
'23
unprotected by an insurance policy.
On direct appeal, after a summary affirmation of the con-

stitutionality of the immunity provision,24 the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed itself to the more formidable problem of the
waiver of immunities presented by section 9-103. The defendant-appellee argued that this section was special legislation
in violation of section 22 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution, since
it made the remedy of an injured person dependent upon the

unrestricted

discretion of local governments

to determine

damages claimed by the plaintiff, by reason of the non-liability of the
insured public entity, for the wrongful or negligent acts of said entity
or its employees, and also waived any right to refuse payment or to deny
liability thereto within the limits of said policy by reason of any nonliability of the insured public entity because of its immunity from suit
by reason of defenses or immunities provided in said statute.
12. That the plaintiff alleges in the alternative that she either has
a right to proceed in an action against the municipal corporation claimed
to be liable, and to recover her damages, or in the event said liability
is barred by the provisions of said Act, which governs actions against
local public entities and public employees, or if her right to so recover
is barred by the Act, she then by virtue of the provisions of said policy
of insurance and of said Act, if the action against the municipal corporation is barred, has a right to proceed in an action directly against the
insurance carrier that issued the said public liability insurance and
thereby assumed the responsibilities provided for in said Act by issuing
said insurance and waived the defense and immunities which otherwise
would have been available to the said municipal corporation.
51 Ill. 2d 274-76. 281 N.E.2d 659, 661 (1972).
20 Section 3-106 provides:
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an
injury where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any
public property intended or permitted to be used as a park, playground,
or open area for recreation purposes unless such local entity or public
employee is guilty of willful and wanton negligence proximately causing
such injury.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-106 (1971).
21412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
22 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
23 51 Ill. 2d at 276, 281 N.E.2d at 661.
24 The Supreme Court first considered appellant's contentions that
section 3-106 of the Act violates section 19 of article II and section 22 of
article IV of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, and that she had been deprived
of due process and equal protection of laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff contended that
section 3-106 deprived her of a legal remedy and that the privilege granted
by this section is arbitrary and irrational. The Court, relying largely on
Maloney, which considered substantially the same contentions in holding
this section valid, found these contentions without merit.
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whether they would be liable for their own negligence by either
purchasing or failing to purchase liability insurance. The
court found that section 9-103(b) was neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable, and held that it was not, therefore, special
legislation. In support, the court reasoned that this section
was applicable to all public entities who elected to avail themselves of its provisions. The court stated that although the
General Assembly could have chosen to omit section 9-103 entirely, to make insurance mandatory, or to exclude any waiver
of defenses or immunities, it instead chose to enact this section
to enable the applicable governmental units to shift the risk
of loss to an insurance carrier. This provision, said the court,
may evidence legislative recognition of the dominant role of
the insurance industry in the field of personal injury litigation.25

With respect to the direct action against the insurance carrier, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
citing Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co., 26 which prohibits
such a direct action.
The supreme court next considered the question raised by
the contentions of count I: whether section 9-103(b) serves
to waive the provision of section 3-106, which provides that a
local public entity is not liable for an injury unless guilty of
willful and wanton negligence.
The court, in holding section 3-106 within the contemplation of the waiver in section 9-103(b) of "defenses and immunities provided in this Act, ' 27 stated that Molitor had enunciated the applicable common law of Illinois when it held such
public entities liable for ordinary negligence. In reasoning
that prior to the Act liability would have been imposed for
injuries resulting from ordinary negligence, the court held that
the immunity granted by section 3-106, originating in the Act
itself, is clearly of the type referred to by section 9-103(b) as
being waived by the purchase of liability insurance.
In the second of these cases, Housewright v. City of La
Harpe, the Illinois Supreme Court extended the operation of
the waiver provision to certain defenses apart from the immunity clauses. Here, plaintiffs sought to recover damages
for personal injuries and for property damage to a truck resulting from a collision between the truck driven by the plaintiff and an automobile owned by defendant, City of La Harpe,
and driven by defendant, Klinedinst, the city marshal. The
complaint contained eight counts; the first four named both the
25

51 11.

2d at 280, 281 N.E.2d at 663.

26 40 Ill.
2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968).

27 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §9-103 (1971).

.arsliall Journal of Practice anid Procedure
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city and Klinedinst as defendants on the theory of respondeat
superior, while the last four named Klinedinst individually alleging alternatively that at the time of the collision he was not

acting within the scope of his employment. Each alternative
alleged counts of both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the plaintiffs had failed to allege the giving of notice to.
the defendant, City, as required by section 8-102 of the Tort

Immunity Act and section 1-4-6 of the Illinois Municipal
8

Code.2

Plaintiffs moved to strike defendant's motion on the ground
that section 8-102 of the Tort Immunity Act and section 1-4-6
of the Municipal Code were unconstitutional. The circuit court
denied plaintiffs' motion and granted defendants' motion, dismissing the eight counts of the complaint.
On appeal, the supreme court once again affirmed the
constitutionality of the Act, and held that section 1-4-6 of the

29
Municipal Code did not apply in the instant case.

The court next considered the effect of section 9-103(b)
28 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 24, §1-4-6 (1971).

Plaintiffs had contended that sections 8-102 and 8-103 of the Tort
Immunity Act violated section 13 of article IV of the Constitution of 1870
which provided: "No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one
subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Also, plaintiffs contended
that these sections violated the constitutional guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the law. The supreme court found sections 8-102 and
8-103 reasonably connected to the general subject of the Act, the tort immunity of local public entities and their employees and within the construction given to section 13 of article IV in previous decisions: People ex rel.
Adams v. Sanes, 41 I1. 2d 381, 243 N.E.2d 233 (1969); Memorial Gardens
Ass'n v. Smith, 16 Ill. 2d 116, 156 N.E.2d 587 (1959) ; People ex rel.
Coutrakon v. Lohr, 9 Ill. 2d 539, 138 N.E.2d 471 (1956) ; Jordan v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 15 111. 2d 369, 155 N.E.2d 297
(1958); People ex rel. Brenza v. Gebbie, 5 Ill. 2d 565, 126 N.E.2d. 657
(1955); King v. Johnson, 47 Ill. 2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970).
As to the plaintiffs' second contention, the court, relying on King v.
Johnson, 47 Ill. 2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970), held that neither the requirement of notice nor the time limitation within which the notice must be given
deprives plaintiff of equal protection of the law.
Section 1-4-6 of the Municipal Code requires muncipalities with less than
500,000 population to indemnify members of its police department to the
extent of $50,000 for judgments rendered against policemen based on
negligence in the performance of their official duties. This section also
requires that, in order to obtain the benefit of such insurance, the police
officer sued must notify the municipality within ten days of service of process
of the fact that the action has been brought against him. Citing Andrews
v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 309, 226 N.E.2d 597 (1967), the court held
that this section does not bar the common law actions asserted in counts I
through IV of the complaint and by its terms does not apply either to those
counts alleging willful and wanton misconduct or those alleging that at the
time of the collision the defendant, city marshal, was not acting in the scope
of his employment. Thus, section 1-4-6 was held not to apply to counts I
through VIII of the complaint, thereby rendering a determination of the
constiutionality of the section unnecessary, as well as rendering the circuit
court's allowance of the motion of dismissal, based on this section, reversible
error.
29
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on the six-month notice provision of section 8-10230 and on the
provision of section 8-103,31 which bars any action where section 8-102 has not been complied with. Plaintiffs contended
that the waiver provision of section 9-103(b) served to waive

the immunity granted by section 8-103 for failure to comply
with the notice provision of section 8-102. Although the supreme court had not previously considered this question, it was
noted that the appellate court had held in the negative in
several cases.32 In its supporting reasoning, the appellate
court had stated: "If the defense of limitations were contemplated by this language [that of section 9-103 (b) 1,this would
mean that the insurance company could not raise the statute
even if the suit were brought some twenty years after the alleged

injury.

Clearly, it is unreasonable to suppose that such a re-

sult was intended by the legislature."3 3 The appellate court
also had said: "The legislature did not intend that the waiver

of immunities by the insurance company have any effect upon
defenses granted to all municipalities including those without
insurance . . .the waiver described .. .is limited to 'immuni-

ties' created by the Act and it has no application to or effect
based upon requirements of notice and limiupon 'defenses'
34
tations."
In reversing, the Illinois Supreme Court first noted that if
section 9-103(b) waived the defense of the one-year limitation
Section 8-102 provides in pertinent part:
Within 6 months from the date that the injury or cause of action
. .. was received or accrued, any person who is about to commence any
civil action for damages on account of such injury against a local public
entity or against any of its employees whose act or omission committed
while acting in the scope of his employment ... caused the injury, must
personally serve in the Office of the Secretary or Clerk ... for the entity
against whom or against whose employee the action is contemplated a
written statement . .. giving the name of the person to whom the cause
of action has accrued, the name and residence of the person injured, the
date and about the hour of the accident, the place or location where the
accident occurred, the general nature of the accident and the name and
address of the attending physician, if any.
ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 85, §8-102 (1971).
31 Section 8-103 provides:
If the notice under section 8-102 is not served as provided therein,
any such civil action commenced against a local public entity, or against
any of its employees . . . shall be dismissed and the person to whom such
cause of injury [sic] accrued shall be forever barred from further suing.
Plaintiffs also alleged facts to show
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, §8-103 (1971).
that the city had actual notice of the information required by section 8-1 02,
but the court held that an allegation of actual notice does not satisfy the
statute's requirement of written notice.
32 Schear v. City of Highland Park, 104 Ill. App. 2d 285, 244 N.E.2d
72 (1969) ; Hoffman v. Evans, 129 Ill. App. 2d 439, 263 N.E.2d 140 (1970) ;
Brown v. Shook, 268 N.E.2d 883 (1971); Rapacz v. Township High School
District No. 207, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 278 N.E.2d 540 (1971).
33 Schear v. City of Highland Park, 104 Ill. App. 2d 285, 293, 244
N.E.2d 72, 76 (1968).
34 Rapacz v. Township High School District No. 207, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1095,
1102-03, 278 N.E.2d 540, 546 (1971).
30
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for commencement of suit provided by section 8-101, the twoyear limitation for personal injuries and the five-year limitation
for property damage provided by the general limitations statutes
would still be available- as defenses to any action brought
"twenty years after the alleged injury," as the appellate court
had hypothesized.
As to the intent of the legislature, the court cited Erford
v. City of Peoria6 which had considered the predecessor of
section 8-102. 37 In Erford, the court said, with regard to the
six-month notice provision: "[S]tatutes of this character are
mandatory; and the giving of notice is a condition precedent
to the right to bring suit, and the giving of the notice must be
averred and proved by the plaintiff to avoid dismissal of his
suit." 38 In Walters v. City of Ottawa"9 the court said, "The
city has no power to waive the notice and is under no liability
41
until it is given." 4° Finally, in Ouimette v. City of Chicago,
the court said, "The question of this notice is entirely within
' 42
legislative control.
Relying on the doctrines of Molitor4 3 and Ouimette, the
court held that, absent a statute, there would be no requirement
of notice of the type provided by section 8-102, and, both notice
and the defense or immunity created by section 8-103 for failure to comply with the provisions of section 8-102 are among
those "defenses and immunities" waived by section 9-103(b),
thus entirely within legislative control.
Since this defense
or immunity exists solely because of section 8-103 of the Act,
and is not excepted from the waiver of section 9-103(b) of
"immunity from suit by reason of the defenses and immunities
provided in this Act," the court reasoned that failure to give
notice was waived by the provision of section 9-103 (b).
Finally, in Fanio v. John Breslin Co., the Illinois Supreme
Court again defined the relationship between the waiver provision and certain defenses granted by the Act. Here, plaintiff
brought suit as administrator of her husband's estate, seeking
damages both for his wrongful death, and obligations incurred
35ILL.

REV. STAT. ch. 83, §15-16 (1971).
36 229 Ill. 546, 182 N.E. 374 (1907).
37Laws of 1905, at 111; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §7 (1913) reenacted as
section 1-4-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §1-4-2
(1963) ; and repealed by section 10-101 of the present Tort Immunities Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §10-101 (1971).
38 Note 36 at 553 supra.
39240
Ill.
259, 88 N.E. 651
40
1d at 263.
41242 Ill. 501, 90 N.E. 300
42 Id. at 507.

(1909).
(1909).

43Molitor v. Kaneland Community School District, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959).
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under the family expense statute, 4 4 by reason of the injuries

and resulting death of her husband.

Two counts of the com-

plaint against the defendant were dismissed for failure to give

the six-month notice and for failure to file suit within one year
from the date the cause of action accrued, as required by sections 8-101 and 8-102 of the Tort Immunity Act. 45

The plaintiff

contended, on appeal, that the "defense" of the required notice
and one-year limitation period were waived by the provisions of
section 9-103 (b) of the Act.
Following the reasoning of Housewright, the court held
that, like sections 8-102 and 8-103, section 8-101 is also subject
to the waiver provision of section 9-103 (b). The court further

stated that the legislative history of the bill offered no basis of
interpretation for section 9-103(b), and that it was the task
solely of the legislature to remedy the construction placed upon

the section by Housewright, if that construction was not in
accord with the legislative intent.
OF SECTION 9-103
As the court pointed out in Sullivan,? section 9-103 (b)
of the Act seems to be an attempt to codify the decision of
Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School District,47 which had abolished immunity to the extent of the liability insurance carried by a school district. After considering
the reasons supporting a grant of immunity, the Thomas court
concluded that they could be condensed into two basic cateINTERPRETATION

gories: first, the notion that "The King can do wrong" and
second, public policy is to protect public funds, and funds intended for "public purposes" should not be diverted to the
44 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 68, §15, (1971).

45 Section 8-101 provides:

No civil action may be commenced in any Court against a local
entity for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the
date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §8-101 (1971).
4G Note 16 supra.
47 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
While never expressly
approved by the Illinois Supreme Court, the rule of Thomas has become
firmly established in Illinois, and is the rule in at least six other states as
well: Indiana - Flowers v. Bd. of Commissioners of the County of Vanderburgh, 240 Ind. 668, 168 N.E.2d 224 (1960); Kentucky - Taylor v. Knox
County Bd. of Ed., 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W.2d 700 (1943) ; Minnesota Schoening v. United States Aviation Underwriters, 265 Minn. 119-20
N.W.2d 859 (1963) ; Oregon - Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C Malheur
County, 226 Or. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961) ; Tennessee - Rogers v. Butler,
170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d 414 (1936) ; Wisconsin - Marshall v. City of
Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 (1963).
Also, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois
acknowledged Thomas as the applicable Illinois law in Tracy v. Davis, 123
F. Supp. 160 (1954). The rule was extended to park districts in Lynwood
v. Decatur Park District, 26 Ill. App. 2d 431, 168 N.E.2d 185 (1960), and to
cities in Beach v. City of Springfield, 32 Il1. App. 2d 256, 177 N.E.2d 436
(1961).
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payment of private judgments.48 The court concluded that
the first category has not survived to the present day as a
sound basis upon which a grant of immunity can be supported,
and reasoned further that, on a practical basis, it would seem
better to distribute the burden of such damage, due to the acts
of a local governmental body, to the community constituting the
government, rather than letting the injured individual bear the
loss without a remedy. The Thomas court found that the second
category provided sound support for an immunity grant, but
concluded that when liability insurance was present, and to the
extent of its protection, the justification and reason for the rule
of immunity was removed. In effect, Thomas held that the
immunity of a local entity from tort liability extended only to
the loss which exceeded the extent of liability insurance coverage. In reaching this conclusion, the Thomas court relied heavily
on Moore v. Moyle, 49 in which the Illinois Supreme Court
had come to the same conclusion in dealing with the immunity
of charitable institutions, whose only basis for immunity was
the protection of the funds of charitable trusts. Through analogy to the "only remaining valid" reason for local governmental immunity, the protection of public funds, Thomas was
able to reach the same result; that the existence of insurance
sufficiently protected these funds to remove the immunity to
the extent of this protection.
Since the Molitor case later abolished immunity entirely,
Thomas had become of little importance during the following
years. However, with the 1965 Tort Immunity Act recreating
the immunity of local public entities on a functional basis, the
question of the effect of liability insurance was likely to arise
once again. The inclusion of section 9-103 in the Act, authorizing the purchase of insurance and waiving immunity to the
extent of insurance coverage, made this likelihood so great that
such cases as Sullivan, Housewright, and Fanio were virtually
inevitable.
The application of the Thomas rule to section 9-103(b)
was the only logical way the court could have interpreted this
provision of the Act. Unfortunately, this raised a constitutional issue by placing the injured party in the position where
recovery would depend on whether the entity was insured. Although the effect of such dependence appears to create an unconstitutionally discriminatory situation, since the entity has
the sole discretion as to whether and to what extent it will be
liable, based on the purchase of liability insurance, the Sulli4s Although in Molitor, seyen years later, the rationale of "protecting
public funds" was rejected.
49 405 I1. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
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van court, when faced squarely with this proposition, found
section 9-103(b) to be "neither arbitrary nor unreasonable,"
and held that "it does not violate section 22 of article IV."5
The court focused on the intent of the General Assembly to
provide a method for local entities to shift the risk of loss to
insurance carriers, noting that section 9-103(b) is "applicable
to all local public entities who elect to avail themselves of its
provisions. ' 51
Thus, it remains questionable as to whether the court
thoroughly examined the constitutional problem presented, or
merely considered it briefly in reaching its decisive holding as to
the effect of the section. This constitutional problem seems to
be the only substantial ground for questioning the results of the
52
three cases.
Apart from the constitutional issue, the reasons supporting the Thomas rule and the rationale for applying that rule
to interpret section 9-103 of the Act are significant. Section
9-103 (a) provides in pertinent part:
A local public entity may contract for insurance against any
loss
53
or liability which may be imposed upon it under this Act.
When section 9-103(b), providing for the "waiver" of
immunity is also considered, it makes a strong case for applying Thomas. A compelling rationale for this application was
stated in Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer.5 4 The Supreme Court of Wyoming severely criticized the Thomas court
for the "impropriety of . . . [basing] decisions on [its] own
concept of 'sociological enlightenment' rather than await legislative reaction to such claimed modern advancement. ' ' 55 The
Maffei court went on to cite considerable authority in support
of its proposition that any waiver of governmental tort immunity must come by "direct action of the legislature or through
the clear and unmistakable implication of its legislative acts. ' 56
The Wyoming court then addressed itself to those Wyoming
50 51 Ill. 2d at 281, 281 N.E.2d at 664.
51 Id.

52See Illinois Tort Claims Act: a New Approach to Municipal Tort
Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 265 (1966). For a good discussion
and critique of recent Illinois decisions establishing the criteria for determining constitutionality of legislative enactments, see Maloney v. Elmhurst
Park District: Park District Immunity in Illinois, the Functional Dilemma,
5 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 368 (1972), which focuses on the constitutionality
of section 3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act.
531LL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §9-103(b) (1971).
5480 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
In Maffei, the Supreme Court
of Wyoming extensively discussed the history of governmental tort immunity,
including an impressive analysis of the Devon case, note 1 supra, and the
English
common law leading to it.
55
1d. at 815.
56 Note 54 supra at 817.
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statutes authorizing school districts to obtain insurance policies.
Although it had agreed with appellants that these statutes
neither specifically created liability nor waived immunity, the
Maffei court did find certain "unmistakable implications":
• . . by giving this express authority to obtain insurance, the
strongest implication arises that the means of realizing the
benefits of such policies were also intended to be granted. To
this end the legislative waiver of the districts' immunity was
implied in order that the entitlement of all concerned, whether in
benefit or protection, might be determined. The logical conclusion, therefore, is not that the acts mentioned give recognition
that governmental elements are not possessed of immunity from
tort action, but rather that they do have an immunity which the
legislature has seen fit to waive to the extent of subjecting
them to a liability limited to moneys made available from "insurance." 7
The Maffei court was unable to find any similar statute
applying to towns (the plaintiff here sought to recover from a
town, not a school district) and therefore denied recovery.
However, the reasoning of Maffei remains a forceful argument
for applying Thomas, which had come to the same conclusion
without the benefit of a statute, and Sullivan, which made the
same argument with an applicable statute in force. It might
even be reasoned that section 9-103 (a) authorizing the purchase of insurance is sufficient statutory authority, standing
alone, and without the waiver provisions of section 9-103 (b),
to apply this sort of an analysis in waiving immunity to
the extent of insurance coverage. However, it must be considered that in section 3-106 of the Act, which applies to Sullivan, the Illinois General Assembly has specifically created immunity for negligence and said immunity does not extend to
willful and wanton conduct, although an argument might be
made that such immunity should not be waived by the implications arising from the authorization to obtain insurance. With
the addition of the waiver provision of section 9-103 (b), the
implication becomes unmistakably clear that the legislature
intended the Thomas rule to apply to local entities which avail
themselves of the authorization of section 9-103(a), and
thereby waive the immunity granted by section 3-106 to the
extent of the insurance purchased.
Turning then to the questions of notice and limitations
raised in the Housewright and Fanio cases, similarity to
the immunity question of Sullivan is found. There is formidable authority for the proposition that the waiver of notice is
5

Id. (emphasis added).
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entirely within control of the legislature,18 and this proposition
is further strengthened by the fact that historically notice and
limitation provisions have never been merely court-created doctrines, but have always been created by legislative enactment.
Moreover, the notice and limitation provisions herein are part
of the Act under consideration. Thus, any waiver of these
provisions must likewise come from the legislature or be unmistakably implied in its acts. Section 9-103(b) refers not
only to a waiver of "immunities" provided in the Act, but to
"defenses" as well. No effect could be given to this language
without applying it to the notice and waiver provisions of
sections 8-101, 8-102, and 8-103, since these are, in fact, the
only "defenses" provided by the Act. The General Assembly
must be presumed to have intended some interpretation to be
given to the term "defenses" in this section by the very fact of
its inclusion. Thus, the court in Housewright and Fanio interpreted this section in the only logical way possible.
OTHER POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION

9-103

One alternative left open to the court in these three cases
would have been to disregard section 9-103 (b) entirely. Such
a construction could be based on the language of subsection (a)
authorizing insurance against liability imposed under this Act.
This would indicate that the legislature merely intended to authorize the local entity to insure against tort judgments in the
areas in which it might be liable, rather than insure its immune
functions; but given the requirement of subsection (b), that
the insurance company waive the entity's immunity, it can only
be concluded that the legislature intended to authorize the purchase of insurance for the immune functions as well.
Another interpretation could rest on the fact that section
9-103(b) does not provide that the insured entity itself waive
that immunity but rather that the insurance company waive the
right to refuse payment because of the insured's immunity.
Thus, one might say that the entity retains its immunity under
the Act, so that an injured party must proceed directly against
the insurance company.
However, this analysis is clearly contrary to the established
public policy of Illinois. The Marchlik case, cited in Sullivan,
points out that such a direct action against insurers has been
permitted by express statutes in only three states, while the
more common policy, and that of Illinois, is to permit an action
against the insurer only after liability has been established and
58 Erford v. City of Peoria, 229 Il1. 546, 82 N.E. 374 (1907); Walters
v. City of Ottawa, 240 I1. 259, 88 N.E. 651 (1909); Ouimette v. City of
Chicago, 242 Il. 501, 90 N.E. 300 (1909).
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a judgment rendered against the insured . 5
The legislature
must be assumed to have enacted this provision with the public
policy of this state in mind and with an awareness of the rule
of Marchlik. The intent of the legislature must have been to
permit suit against an insured public entity to determine liability and obtain judgment before any action against its insurer.
Since the insurer is required to waive any right to refuse payment or deny liability, this waiver must apply as well to the insured public entity in the necessary action against it to determine the insurer's liability. If this were not true, the requirement of waiver in this section would be meaningless as the insurer would have no reason to assert such immunities or defenses if they had already been successfully asserted by the entity in determining liability. Thus, the legislature must have
intended that there be a means of obtaining the benefit of the
insurance provided by section 9-103 (a). Since the public policy
of the state prohibits any other interpretation, the legislature
must have intended section 9-103(b) to waive the immunities
and defenses provided by the Act in any suit against an insured
public entity to determine liability within the limits of the insurance, this being a necessary preliminary to the liability of the
insurer.
CONCLUSION
The "immunities and defenses" considered in these three
cases are found in sections based on the policy of protecting
public funds. It is clear that the same protection rationale of
reducing such to the extent of insurance coverage will apply
to all other sections of the Tort Immunity Act, including the
immunity-granting sections.
However, there are a few sections which are supported by
a different policy consideration; that certain governmental
functions should not be subject to judicial scrutiny beyond a
review of any constitutional issues which might arise. In these
areas the assumption is that the fundamental decision making
functions of local bodies should be reviewed only by their electorate, and that any judicial review, except with respect to
constitutional issues, would be a usurpation of the powers of
the people. Such essential functions of local government are
only those which are necessary to preserve safety and order in
society, and are not merely for the convenience or enjoyment of
the populace, or merely incident to the implementation of
these necessities.
As an example, the immunity granted by section 4-102
59 Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Company, 40 Ill. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d
799 (1968).
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relates to the function of providing a police force. The necessary governmental function in this area includes the decision
whether to establish a police force, the size of the force, and the
duties of officers; any further actions merely being an implementation or extension of that fundamental decision making
function. The entity would therefore be liable for the negligence of an officer driving his squad car, because this would
be part of the implementation of the essential function, rather
than a part of the function itself.0o
Aside from those few sections which are founded upon the
policy of removing essential governmental functions from judicial review, all of the immunities granted in the Act are a
result of the policy of protecting public funds. Thus, all of
these immunities, following the rationale of Sullivan, Housewright, and Fanio, should be subject to the waiver provision of
section 9-103 (b).
It is not likely that the constitutional problems of section
9-103(b) will be given a favorable hearing by the Illinois
courts in the near future, considering the precedent of Sullivan's upholding the constitutionality of section 9-103. However, considering its merit, this issue remains a real threat to
9-103 (b).
Presently, however, those local entities covered by the
Act, which purchase liability insurance, are going to be held
to have waived most of the immunities granted by the Act to
the extent of that coverage. The argument of removing essential functions from judicial review has not yet been advanced,
and may protect some immunities from such a waiver; but the
constitutional argument is not likely to produce the same results
in the wake of these decisions.
Roger French
60 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §4-102 (1971).
Other examples are §§2-103,
2-108, and 5-101, which provide non-liability for failing to adopt or enforce
any law, failure to grant public welfare goods or moneys, and failure to
provide fire protection service, respectively.

